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The shock of the September 11 airplane attacks has made the improbable and the catastrophic suddenly seem possible. Crop dusters have been grounded for fears of a biological attack. Guards are posted at many city reservoirs. Trucks are being inspected on their way into New York. But some scenarios are more likely than others. That's why we've assembled this guide to help you sort out the threats for yourself and see what precautions people are taking.
The possibility of any of these things happening is extremely remote. Even assembling the needed biological or chemical agents would require far more organization, money and expertise than was evident on September 11. But, in the interest of being prepared for the unlikely and also calming down any unnecessary fears, here's what's being done, and what you can do.
Smallpox
It doesn't take an exotic virus like Ebola to transform the U.S. into a hot zone. A single case of smallpox could put the entire nation at risk. The smallpox virus is highly contagious and would spread quickly because Americans are not vaccinated. Routine inoculations were halted in 1972. People vaccinated before 1972 lost most of their immunity within 10 years.
A terrorist who wanted to launch a smallpox attack, however, would probably have a very hard time getting hold of the virus. Smallpox was eradicated in 1980. Officially, only two stores of the virus exist, for research purposes, in secure locations in the U.S. and Russia. There may be covert stashes in Iraq, North Korea and Russia, but these countries would be reluctant to release them, fearing a smallpox epidemic among their own unvaccinated people. Even if a terrorist were successful in obtaining the virus, his plans could backfire: smallpox is so contagious that the first victims are likely to be the members of his own terrorist cell.
Anthrax
Many bacterial agents can be used as bioweapons, including Clostridium botulinum (botulism) and Yersinia pestis (plague). But anthrax stands out because its spores are particularly hardy; they are resistant to sunlight, heat and disinfectant, and can remain active in soil and water for years. Anthrax occurs naturally in both wild and domestic animals‹including cattle, sheep and camels. Infection from direct contact with affected animals is fatal in 20% of cases. If inhaled, however, anthrax spores cause death in almost 90% of the time.
Yet manufacturing sufficient quantities of any bacteria in a stable form is a technical and scientific challenge; plague bugs, for example, degrade within hours when exposed to the sun, and anthrax spores tend to clump together in humid conditions. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo sprayed anthrax and botulism eight times over parts of Tokyo without effect.
Despite all the attention being given crop dusters, using one to spread germs is not as easy as it sounds. The planes are designed to spray pesticides in heavy, concentrated streams, whereas bioweapons are ideally scattered in a fine mist over as large an area as possible. The nozzles in crop dusters are best suited to discharging relatively large particles — 100 microns in diameter — not tiny one-micron specks of bacteria.
Sarin
Unlike biological agents, which are living organisms that require proper conditions to survive, chemical weapons such as the nerve gases sarin and VX are relatively easy to acquire and stockpile. Chemicals are difficult to manufacture in sufficient quantities for a large-scale attack, however; more likely are isolated assaults such as the 1995 sarin attack on a Tokyo subway that injured thousands and killed 12.
Reservoirs
Poisoning your enemy's well is an ancient tradition, but would-be terrorists would find it extremely hard to inflict widespread casualties through our water supply. Chlorine in treated water kills most microbes, and huge quantities of chemical toxins would have to be dumped into a reservoir to make many people sick, let alone kill them. (A U.N. study estimated that it would take 10 tons of potassium cyanide.) Drinking water might be threatened locally, however, if someone managed to tap the pipe going into a building or neighborhood or infiltrate a water-treatment facility. With this threat in mind, municipal water authorities have stepped up security.
Dams
If poisoning the water supply doesn't work, terrorists might try to cut it off or disrupt it. On an even grander scale, they might blow up a dam, causing widespread flooding damage downstream. Compounding the impact would be the loss of hydroelectric-power generation. With security beefed up at major dams across the country, however, especially at landmark behemoths such as Hoover and Grand Coulee dams, it would take a very determined effort to carry out such an attack.
Chemical plants
some 850,000 facilities in the U.S. handle hazardous chemicals. Many substances that have benign industrial uses, such as metal cleaning or photo developing, can in theory be turned into dangerous weapons. But gaining access to plants, either for sabotage or to get raw materials, is difficult. Employees handling hazardous materials undergo security background checks, and chemical manufacturers across the country last week were double-checking their employee rolls. Since Sept. 11, most facilities have barred outside visitors and allowed only authorized personnel to enter.
Trucking companies
dangerous chemicals are most vulnerable to interception while they are being transported. Today 2.5 million Americans have commercial driver's licenses to carry fuels and other hazardous materials. Truckers must pass two tests: the federally mandated 30-question multiple-choice test (states can add more questions) to obtain a commercial vehicle license and a separate test on the procedures for safely handling hazardous substances. After the arrest of about 20 people suspected of fraudulently obtaining haz-mat licenses, chemical companies tightened their transport policies, assigning two drivers to every vehicle and using satellite tracking systems to monitor haulers from pickup to drop-off.
Salmonella
as oregon's rajneeshee cult demonstrated in 1984, it is not difficult to set off a wave of food poisonings. Indeed, gastroenteritis caused by natural contamination and careless food handling afflicts millions and results in 5,000 deaths each year. The Rajneeshees considered a number of different viruses and bacteria, including those that cause hepatitis and typhus, but decided for their purposes (disrupting the outcome of a local election) on a strain of salmonella that would be debilitating but not fatal. Salmonella poisonings tend to be localized. With proper hygiene, the bacterium is not particularly contagious.
E. coli
an even easier bug to obtain is the familiar intestinal parasite E. coli. Naturally occurring outbreaks of E. coli, typically the result of fecal contamination in everything from hamburgers to swimming pools, sicken hundreds of thousands of Americans each year. In New York City this spring, a man was arrested after he was spotted spraying what turned out to be feces-laden water over the contents of a midtown salad bar (fortunately, no one got sick). A far more virulent strain of the bacterium called O157:H7 is sometimes fatal, but identifying and isolating the right strain is beyond the technical capabilities of most terrorists.
Foot-and-mouth disease
A terrorist attack aimed at crops and livestock would be less dramatic but might cause more disruption in the long run. Such attempts are not unheard of. In World War II, Britain accused Germany of dropping small, cardboard bombs filled with beetle pests on English potato fields, and in the 1980s Tamil militants threatened to target Sri Lankan tea and rubber plantations with plant pathogens. Perhaps the most worrisome threat to U.S. agriculture is foot-and-mouth disease, which can spread with astonishing speed in sheep, cattle and swine. Not seen in this country since 1929, the disease is harmless to humans but renders farm animals economically worthless. The U.S. could be forced to destroy much of its own livestock, as Great Britain had to do earlier this year.
Car, truck and backpack bombs
Exotic weapons get a lot of attention, but conventional explosives and suicide bombers in pizza parlors, discothèques and shopping malls can spread terror with stunning effectiveness. Fertilizer bombs like the one that destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Okla., in 1995 could wreak havoc with bridges, tunnels and buildings. Nuclear-power and chemical-manufacturing plants make even more horrifying targets. The 1984 leak at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, may have killed 3,000. Estimates of the final death toll from the 1986 explosion in the Chernobyl nuclear plant run as high as 30,000.
Nuclear weapons
The ultimate nightmare would be terrorists in the U.S. wielding nuclear
weapons. For this reason, the ability to create — or worse, steal or buy —
weapons-grade plutonium has long been an issue of great concern and
international intrigue. Fortunately, the practical difficulties in acquiring
precisely the right materials, not to mention the engineering know-how to
jerry-build a nuclear device successfully, makes this type of threat highly
unlikely.
Germ warfare has been around since at least the Middle Ages, when armies
besieging a city would catapult corpses infected with the black plague over the
walls. Today the bugs authorities most fear are anthrax (a bacterium) and
smallpox (a virus). Both are highly lethal: the former kills nearly 90% of its
victims, the latter some 30%. Anthrax is not communicable; smallpox, on the
other hand, can be transmitted with horrifying ease from one person to another.
"The feelings of uncertainty, of who is infected, of who will get infected,
are the main advantages of biowarfare," says Stephen Morse of the Columbia
University School of Public Health.
During the cold war, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union began developing anthrax
as a biological weapon. Today 17 nations are believed to have biological weapons
programs, many of which involve anthrax. Officially, the only sources of
smallpox are small quantities in the labs of the Centers for Disease Control in
Atlanta and at Vector in Koltsovo, Russia. But experts believe that Russia, Iraq
and North Korea have all experimented with the virus and that significant secret
stashes remain. Even more worrisome are reports that Russia used genetic
engineering to try to make anthrax and smallpox more lethal and resistant to
antibiotics and vaccines. (The U.S. put a similar program on hold.)
Why not just vaccinate every American against every possible germ-warfare agent?
That would be impractical, if not impossible, and the side effects of the
inoculations would pose a significant health risk. Instead, says Michael
Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at
the University of Minnesota, we should strengthen the country's public health
system. After Sept. 11, hospitals in New York City were asked to report any
outbreaks of unusual symptoms. Health experts know that in the event of
biological attack, the earlier an epidemic is detected, the easier it is to
contain.
Experts in antiterrorism share their concern. At the turn of the past century,
says Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corp., epidemics of diseases like yellow fever
and cholera kept health workers on their toes. Now, after a decade of cutbacks,
"our ability to treat large numbers of casualties has been reduced,"
he says. "The notion of reinvesting to create a muscular public health
system is not a bad idea, even if there is no terrorism."
General Safeguards
Nightmare Scenario: Untrue
Anthrax is a deadly but non-contagious soil bacteria. The nightmare scenario
found in a chain email currently making its way around the Internet states:
100 grams of anthrax properly dispersed downwind over Washington, D.C., for
example, could kill between 150,000 and three million people in the surrounding
areas.
The reality is more benign; the Johns
Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies says this scenario would
actually require 100 kilograms and only those directly exposed would be
infected. Hospitals would initially notice an epidemic of cold and flu-like
symptoms, deteriorating into severe breathing problems and then death in those
not treated with common antibiotics.
Safeguards
More Information
Hypothetical Exercise
In June 2001 anti-terrorism authorities held war games, called Dark Winter, to
simulate a deliberate aerosol release of smallpox in three U.S. states. Such
high level players as former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and James R. Woolsey, former
director of the CIA participated, and did not fare well: In the scenario,
highly-contagious disease spread to 25 states and 15 other countries within two
weeks as the players failed to establish effective quarantines and current
vaccine stockpiles proved inadequate.
The Dark Winter exercise has alerted public health officials of the need to
promote early detection and the importance of isolating infected individuals,
monitoring contacts, and instituting a selective vaccination program.
Safeguards
More Information
Likelihood: Very Unlikely
In March 2001 the Journal of the American Medical Association published a report
speculating about the effects of an aerial spraying of anthrax.
The same article named intentional contamination of the U.S. food supply as
another bio-terrorism concern.
The report also pointed out that Aum Shinrikyo, the terrorist group responsible
for the release of sarin in a Tokyo, Japan, subway station in 1995, dispersed
aerosols of anthrax and botulism throughout Tokyo on at least 8 occasions. For
unclear reasons, the attacks failed to produce illness.
Safeguards
More Information
Likelihood: Not Very Likely
During the Cold War both the U.S. and the Soviet Union worked to develop methods
of aerosol-releasing (spraying) plague bacteria into the atmosphere. A terrorist
could do this with a crop duster airplane, a spray bottle or a variety of other
methods. A 1970 World Health Organization report estimated that a city of 5
million sprayed with 50 kilograms of plague bacteria would suffer 36,000 dead.
Safeguards
More Information
Likelihood: Extremely Unlikely
A terrorist could deliberately infect himself with the Ebola virus and travel to
a major city, seeking to spread the disease to its citizens (via sexual contact,
sharing needles). Most people infected with Ebola die within a week, and suffer
obvious, debilitating symptoms (including profuse bleeding from major body
openings); thus any terrorist's "window of opportunity" to infect
others would be brief. Given its gruesome symptoms and the relative difficulty
of transmission, Ebola is perhaps more valuable to bioterrorists as a threat
than as an actual weapon.
Safeguards
More Information
VACCINES
Preventing a disease is always better than having to cure it,
but most of these vaccines were developed before bioterrorism
emerged as a threat, and few are widely available
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: AVAILABILITY OF VACCINES |
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VACCINE'S EFFECTIVENESS |
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Anthrax |
First signs of inhaled anthrax may resemble those of a common cold; then breathing problems, hemorrhage, edema and shock. Untreated, about 90% of cases are fatal |
An early version of the U.S. vaccine was 93% successful in protecting against the disease. Full treatment involves six shots followed by an annual booster |
Only to military personnel and others whose jobs put them at high risk; approved only for healthy adults between the ages of 18 and 65 |
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Pneumonic Plague |
Fever, chills, weakness, shortness of breath, cough with bloody sputum. If not treated early, rapid onset of septic shock and death |
May prevent bubonic plague, but that is not the form of the disease that would likely result from a bioweapon attack. Pneumonic plague should be treated with antibiotics |
Recommended only for people who work with the plague pathogen, Yersinia pestis, or in plague-infested areas |
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Smallpox |
High fever, fatigue, severe headache and backache, followed by a characteristic rash and deep, round lesions. Highly infectious |
Given prior to exposure, provides almost 100% protection against the disease. Still effective up to four days after exposure |
Extremely limited. Not recommended since 1980, when disease was eradicated. The U.S. has a few million doses; 40 million more on order |
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Botulism |
Blurred vision, slurred speech, difficulty swallowing, progressive muscle weakness that spreads from head to toe, paralysis, respiratory failure |
Believed effective against five of the seven types of botulism toxin but still being tested |
Only on an experimental basis for those believed at high risk of exposure. The standard treatment is to administer antitoxin after exposure |
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Tularemia |
Abrupt onset of high fever, followed by pneumonia, pleuritis and systemic infection. Can lead to respiratory failure, shock or death. Highly infectious |
Provides partial protection against infection by inhalation or direct contact. Antibiotics are the treatment of choice |
Only given to people who work routinely with tularemia bacteria. Not yet approved by the Food and Drug Administration |
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Face Masks
In New York a lot of people bought face masks from their local hardware stores
to deal with particles in the air. The more expensive ones filter out more
particles: A N100 or P100 mask will do more than an N95 or P95, although they
still filter out a good deal. They won't do much about a biological attack in
your neighborhood but can help if you're 30 miles away from one. QCSupply
has a good assortment of masks.
Gas Masks
The September 11 attacks led to a run on gas masks, most of which sold out in
the first week. Don't feel too bad. Unlike obvious provisions such as food and
medicine, gas masks are only useful in very specific instances. And even then
there is unlikely to be enough advance warning to put one on. Nevertheless, the
most important factors are a snug, airtight fit and a properly installed filter.
There are half-masks that just cover the mouth, but it's a good idea to protect
your eyes. Some filters are specialized, filtering out something specific like
chemical gasses or nuclear dust. If you want to protect yourself from the most
possibilities you'll need an NBC mask, which filters Nuclear dust, Biological
entities and Chemical gasses and aerosols. At the newsgroup misc.survivalism
there are big arguments over which gas mask is the best, but in the end it seems
to be a matter of which one feels the best when you put it on. There are also
other considerations; one guy didn't like the US Army M17 mask because he said
it made firing a rifle more difficult. You can buy a gas mask designed for
civilians for $25 to $35, like the popular Israeli Gas Mask (currently selling
on Ebay for $75 and up) although there are
$200 military masks which have features like straw adapters so you don’t have
to take them off to sip water. You can read the gas mask reviews of a guy named
Grunt here.
When buying a gas mask the most important thing is to check the expiration dates
of the filters and the age of the masks itself. You'll need to check for leaks.
One way is to get someone to dip a Q-tip in some banana oil, then have them wave
it around your head while you're wearing the mask. If you smell banana then you
don't want the mask.
According to Maine Military, an Army
surplus store, a gas mask won't do you the slightest bit of good. Without
knowing what chemicals are in the air and how often your filter needs to be
changed, the mask is useless. Until September 11, Main Military mainly sold
masks to kids who would use them as Halloween costumes or adapt them for use in
smoking marijuana.
Supplied Air Respirators
Gas Masks won't work if there's not enough oxygen in the air, so the next step
up is the Supplied Air Respirator. This is a hood that completely covers the
head and a tube that runs to an oxygen tank. You can find one for $500 or so.
The EPA has more on these respirators.
Vapor Proof Suits
One problem with gas masks is they don't protect the rest of your body, and
chemicals can be absorbed through the skin. To protect against that you can get
a supplied air respirator with a full body suit. You would need a vapor proof
suit, which would run you around $1300. This is the kind of setup used by people
who have to go into leaking nuclear power plants. In an emergency you'd probably
be dead before you got the suit on, but if you want to feel you're as prepared
as humanly possible this is definitely the way to go.